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Abstract
Novel risks generate copious amounts of uncertainty, which in turn can confuse and mislead publics. This commentary ex-
plores those issues through the lens of information seeking and processing, with a focus on social media and the potential
effectiveness of science journalism.
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As I write this commentary, Covid-19 continues its re-
lentless march across nations, neighborhoods and fam-
ilies. While stringent control measures are beginning to
weaken the coronavirus’s foothold in some parts of the
world, scientists continue to scramble to understand this
novel threat and to develop ways to intervene.
What fertile ground for perceptions of uncertainty!
Both communication scholars (see, for example, Krause,
Freiling, Beets, & Brossard, 2020) and savvy science jour-
nalists such as The Atlantic’s Ed Yong (2020) are turning
their attention to uncertainty as both a facilitator of and
a roadblock to functional use of Covid-19 information.
Front and center in these explorations is social media,
where information, misinformation and disinformation
all flourish. In this brief commentary, I will reflect on the
ways in which social media are affecting uncertainty per-
ceptions about the pandemic, aswell as onways inwhich
journalists can contribute to a more accurate reckoning
in this crisis.
First, a quick look at uncertainty itself. I like to think
of uncertainty as an awareness of what we do not know.
Where that uncertainty resides and how it is articulated
varies, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1982), who
divide uncertainty into two domains: external and inter-
nal. External uncertainty captures the limitations of ev-
idence in the external world, articulated in journal arti-
cles, in TED talks by experts, in conversations with our
doctors. Internal uncertainty, on the other hand, is re-
flected in our personal judgments about the risks around
us. Those perceptions may be influenced by an under-
standing of what we do not know (uncertainty), as well
as, inadvertently, by phenomena of which we are not
aware (ignorance).
Kampourakis and McCain advance this understand-
ing of uncertainty by themselves employing two dimen-
sions. In their recent book, Uncertainty: How It Makes
ScienceAdvance (Kampourakis&McCain, 2019), they dis-
tinguish between epistemic and psychological certainty.
Epistemic certainty requires the presence of evidence
that is “so strong that it makes it impossible that you
could be wrong” (Kampourakis & McCain, 2019, p. 7,
italics in original), while psychological certainty reflects
“how strongly we believe something” (Kampourakis &
McCain, 2019, p. 6). Since science can never muster
enough evidence to enable epistemic certainty, they ar-
gue, we must live with personal, psychological uncer-
tainty and better understand the factors that influence
it. Kahneman and Tversky, I believe, would agree.
Those factors include the extent to which a person
is willing to seek out and then process information ef-
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fortfully, as systematic processing has long been associ-
ated with more accurate risk perceptions. Alas, we hu-
mans have never been good at this. We typically engage
in rather superficial information seeking and process-
ing, relying on small dollops of information from a mod-
est cadre of sources (sometimes even one source will
do!) for even the most important decisions. And when it
comes to judgments of the credibility of evidence about a
risk, that means we are far more likely to judge the credi-
bility of information channels rather than engaging in the
more effortful process of evaluating information sources.
Assuming that stories in TheGuardian or on FoxNews are
trustworthy saves individuals the time needed to evalu-
ate the credibility of each of the many sources that they
encounter in the stories offered by those channels.
German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzermaintains that
relying on such “rules of thumb” to make rapid decisions
can be quite functional, as that reliance is often based on
years of experience with the world around us (see, for
example, Gigerenzer, 2015). I get that. But how can we
extract reliable information when we encounter a novel
threat and when our information environment is awash
in contradictory information? That, in a nutshell, is the
situation we face with the Covid-19 pandemic.
Uncertainty in the face of health threats scares peo-
ple, and novel threats such as Covid-19 maximize the
perception of uncertainty in several ways. For one thing,
as of this writing we truly know little about this virus,
whose official name, conferred only in February 2020,
is “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2)’’ (Joseph, 2020). The illness itself is called
Covid-19, which stands for “coronavirus disease 2019”;
I will use that latter term henceforth. Scientists are con-
tinually unearthing information about this coronavirus,
but external/epistemic uncertainty remains extremely
high. Ed Yong, in his April 29 article, notes that much
about the pandemic remains “maddeningly unclear”
(Yong, 2020). Even systematic information seekers and
processors, as rare as they are, are hard-pressed to learn
enough about the virus and its impact to feel even mod-
estly efficacious.
Another uncertainty generator is thewide variance in
policy responses to the spread of Covid-19 both across
countries and within them. While one country remains
virtually locked down, another restricts only the elderly
and infirm. While one city extends orders to stay home,
another opens restaurants and hair salons. Country lead-
ers uniformly express caution, but their messaging re-
veals wildly varying levels of coping with the pandemic.
Finally, the internet and social media have played
a major role in exacerbating uncertainty perceptions.
Many individuals worldwide now use social media as
their primary—perhaps their only—news channel, al-
though surveys in the US indicate that Americans regard
social media as less trustworthy deliverers of news than
more traditional channels. A recent survey of US adults
about their pandemic perceptions found high levels of
distrust of social media channels; for example, nearly
50% of respondents said that they distrust Facebook as a
source of Covid-19 information (Ballew et al., 2020). The
most trusted sources of information emerging from that
survey, not surprisingly, were personal physicians and in-
fectious disease experts.
Reliance on less trustworthy channels, such as stories
posted on one’s Facebook feed, seems to make no sense.
But scholars who study channel use have found that,
given two factors influencing channel choices—the like-
lihood of finding relevant information and the ‘cost’ of
accessing a channel—the latter often trumps the former.
For example, although we prefer to interact with medi-
cal professionals when we need health information, we
rarely do so. Instead, we ‘make do’ with mediated chan-
nels and the internet because the cost—both in terms of
time and money—is much less.
However, reliance on less trustworthy channels
opens the door to misinformation (information that is
inadvertently inaccurate) and disinformation (informa-
tion that is deliberately inaccurate) about the pandemic.
In mid-April, UN Secretary-General António Guterres
warned of a “global misinfo-demic” around the world
prompted by “falsehoods” on the airwaves and “wild
conspiracy theories” on the internet (United Nations,
2020). We know that false messages are shared more
frequently online than are accurate ones, thanks to their
high levels of emotional content and vividness (Vosoughi,
Roy, & Aral, 2018). And we also know that the pres-
ence of conflicting messages in one’s social feed makes
it more difficult for an individual to distinguish the cred-
ible from the non-credible (Karduni et al., 2018). That
means this avalanche of inconsistent, sometimes mis-
leading information can dramatically increase percep-
tions of uncertainty.
We are desperate to reduce uncertainty in times like
this in order to select a path through an imminent risk,
and communication theories suggest a number of uncer-
tainty reduction drivers that influence our seeking and
use of information. For example, Kim Witte’s Extended
Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1994) predicts that fear
combined with a sense of helplessness can lead a person
to try to bury a problem by ignoring it. In such situations,
individualsmay avoid information altogether and engage
in ‘business as usual.’
Another driver is our tendency to perceive ourselves
as more immune to a risk than are others. Multiple stud-
ies over the years have found that we tend to downplay
our likelihoodof harm from risks of all kinds.When asked,
we report that ‘others’ are far more likely to be harmed
than are we. Dubbed ‘optimism bias’ (Weinstein, 1989),
this sense of personal invulnerability can lead a person to
readily ingest even conflicting information about a risk
but then to set aside the information because it is ‘not
about me.’ A recent survey supporting this “me/them”
differential pattern found that, while 62% of Americans
thought the coronavirus will do a “great deal” of harm to
people in the country, only 25% felt that the virus would
harm them personally (Ballew et al., 2020).
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A third important driver is to limit one’s exposure
to conflicting information by employing that channel
heuristic, defaulting to the information channels we
deem credible. That means that individuals, although
they may access a similar volume of messages about
the pandemic, are not encountering the samemessages.
Beliefs about what is true begin to vary in dysfunctional
ways at an aggregate level, leading to a challenging sit-
uation: Individuals may report relatively high levels of
Covid-19 knowledge but may, in fact, ‘know’ wildly dis-
similar things.
Intensifying this channel heuristic is the early politi-
cization of the Covid-19 pandemic itself. Nisbet and col-
leagues have tracked this process in other science is-
sues and found that information about a science issue
is usually driven largely by the scientific community in
initial stages but then is gradually dominated by politi-
cal sources (Nisbet & Fahy, 2015). Over time—think cli-
mate change, evolution, vaccines and autism—the issue
becomes firmly embedded in ideological discourse, en-
couraging use of information channels that help sup-
port those ideological viewpoints. While issue politiciza-
tion in science is, unfortunately, not unusual, the speed
with which the coronavirus pandemic became politicized
has been breathtaking. Political figures and ideological
groups began building partisan narratives about the risk
immediately, competing directly with science narratives
that sought to focus on evidence.
So how can journalists negotiate these volatile wa-
ters in ways that deliver information that can help read-
ers maintain an accurate sense of pandemic uncertainty?
For one thing, science journalists continue to privilege sci-
entific sources and, although trust in all occupations has
declined in the US over the decades, scientists and physi-
cians remain high in the credibility line-up. Most of us are
more likely to believe what scientists tell us about a scien-
tific issue thanwhatwe glean fromother types of sources.
For another thing, a large contingent of news con-
sumers continues to rely on mediated channels for in-
formation, where journalists gather and evaluate infor-
mation before packaging it for public consumption. This
gives specialized journalists an opportunity to maintain
some control over the Covid-19 narratives. The quality
of science journalism stories generally has increased over
the years, and efforts to copewith declining revenue and
competition from socialmedia has sparked an increase in
analytical stories, which concentrate on context and pro-
moting understanding. The piece by journalist Ed Yong
(2020) is an excellent example of that trend. Nisbet and
Fahy (2015) devote an entire article to a discussion of
“knowledge-based” journalism as a “fix” for the volatile
information world journalism now inhabits.
Finally, a dramatic increase in fact-checking among
media organizations around the world gives audiences
the opportunity to access almost immediate compar-
isons between claims and evidence for or against those
assertions. Krause et al. (2020) warn that issues of trust
can attenuate the power of fact-checking, but journalists’
willingness to analyze the validity of truth claims is a wel-
come step.
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